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ABSTRACT
Location-aware applications have witnessed massive worldwide
growth in recent years due to the introduction and advancement of
smartphones. Most of these applications rely on the Global Position-
ing System (GPS) which is not available in indoor environments.
As a result, Wi-Fi fingerprinting is becoming increasingly popular
as an alternative as it allows localizing users in indoor environ-
ments, has lower power consumption, and is also more economical
as it does not require a dedicated sensor other than a Wi-Fi card.
The technique allows a service provider (SP) to construct a Wi-Fi
database (called radio map) that can be used as a reference point
to localize a user. However, this process does not preserve the user
privacy, as the location can only be computed interactively with
the SP. The service provider may also reveal sensitive information
on the indoor space (e.g. the building map) to the user. Thus, we
need an indoor localization protocol that addresses the privacy of
both parties. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving cryp-
tographic protocol for indoor Wi-Fi localization, that prevents the
SP from learning the exact location of the user outside of certain
pre-defined sensitive areas, while keeping the SP’s database secure.
Thus, both parties cannot learn anything about each other’s input
beyond the implicit output revealed.
KEYWORDS
location privacy, cryptographic protocols, Bloom filter
ACM Reference Format:
Samuel N. Eshun and Paolo Palmieri. 2019. A privacy-preserving protocol for
indoor Wi-Fi localization. In Proceedings of Proceedings of the 16th conference
on Computing Frontiers (CF ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
1 INTRODUCTION
Location-aware applications in recent years have witnessed a mas-
sive growth worldwide. Most of these applications rely on Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for users of such applications
to obtain their location. An example of a popularly used GNSS is
the Global Positioning System (GPS). However, GPS perform bet-
ter when used in an open environment (outdoors) and is mostly
unavailable or has very poor signals if used indoors. Instead, theWi-
Fi-fingerprinting-based localization approach [1, 4, 19] is currently
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regarded as the most promising technique for providing accurate
information for indoor areas. In particular, a major advantage of
this method is that the existing Wi-Fi-infrastructure, based on the
IEEE 802.11 standard [8], makes it easier and cheaper to deploy
with no additional hardware cost.
In order to infer a user’s location, Wi-Fi fingerprinting requires
a location fingerprinting database known as a radio map, built
by recording Received Signal Strength (RSS) from various access
points (APs) in different locations [9, 11]. Therefore, fingerprinting
localization has two phases: the offline and the online phase. In
the offline phase, the Wi-Fi RSS from all the various APs of known
positions in the building or desired indoor area are recorded, in
order to build a database (radio map) saved on the service provider’s
server. The online phase, where the user interacts with the service,
comes with two sub-phases. First, the user measures the location
fingerprint (RSS) from all the APs in range at its current location
(a grid point). The location fingerprint is then sent to the central
server to make a computation which compares the RSS received to
the reference radio map built in the offline phase, with the help of
a trained decision, in order to determine the location of the user in
the building.
The computation of the location can be done, among others,
using Euclidean distance, likelihood estimator, or support vector
machine for regression [3]. Although Wi-Fi-fingerprinting localiza-
tion is promising, unlike GNSS, it can violate user’s location privacy
or leak user’s location information [13, 14, 17]. This is due to the fact
that the user computes the location interactively with the server,
therefore revealing their location to the service provider. One of the
proposed solutions is to allow the client to have full access to the
radio map to compute the position locally [12, 19]. However, this
approach burdens not only the already constrained computational
resources of the user (especially in mobile settings) but can also lead
to a serious privacy breach of the service providers’s database. In
particular, this could leak the entire map of a particular building. If
we consider sensitive settings such as an airport, this is clearly not
desirable. To solve this problem, most of the literature focuses on
the privacy of the user neglecting the Service Provider (SP) [12, 19],
thereby exposing the SP’s database. Another area that has not been
fully addressed so far, is how can the SP have real-time access to the
user’s location without at the same time violating the user’s privacy.
For example, an employer may wish to monitor his employees in
areas deemed sensitive, without violating their privacy elsewhere
in the building; and can this be achieved indoor with a secured
database that cannot be used for malicious activities by users.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we present an indoor location privacy-preserving
protocol that allows a service provider to query the location of a
user without violating their location privacy. The protocol protects
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both the user and the SP’s privacy but still delivers the service
based on the user’s location. Thus, both the SP and the client are
mutually distrusting, hence a typical problem of secure multi-party
computation. The protocol builds on the data structure presented
by Palmieri et al. [5, 6, 16] to protect users’ privacy. The protocol
also uses homomorphic encryption and the (spatial) Bloom filter
(SBF) [5, 6, 16], a modification of the classical Bloom filter [2], to
build trust among both parties.
In particular, we summarize the main contributions of this paper
below:
• To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the
first to use a probabilistic data structure (SBF, a variant of
the original Bloom filter) to address privacy of indoor local-
ization based on Wi-Fi-fingerprinting. While other privacy-
preserving protocols for indoor localization exist in the liter-
ature (such as [13], later expanded in [18]), this paper does
not focus on how the user can obscure the location from the
service provider, but on a broader perspective: how a service
provider in a private manner can have real-time access to
users location without violating their privacy.
• The proposed construction includes an efficient decision
algorithm over additive homomorphic encryption that can
locate the user with a high probability without leaking any
location information, achieving private indoor localization
over Wi-Fi fingerprinting.
• Further to this, the partial homomorphic computation (based
on Paillier’s cryptosystem [15] or any other scheme pro-
viding additive homomorphism) used to encrypt location
information enables privacy-preserving location-based appli-
cations based on the private indoor localization. In particular,
it guarantees the privacy of both the service provider and
the user, such that when the user is not at a sensitive area
the SP learns nothing about the location.
• Finally, the proposed scheme only utilizes the existing Wi-
Fi infrastructure, and doesn’t require new devices for the
indoor environment or additional resources.
2 PRIVATE INDOORWI-FI LOCALIZATION
In this section, we give a general overview of Wi-Fi-fingerprinting.
The process can be divided into two-phases: offline (performed
by the service provider), and online (which involves both parties,
service provider and user).
In the offline phase, the SP records the Wi-Fi-fingerprinting
known as received signal strength in an area assumed to be a rect-
angular grid of points of interest (xi ,yi ). Each location point (xi ,yi )
where i = 1 · · · l falls within a range of an Access Points (AP), and
the pair (x,y) is the location coordinate of the fingerprint. The RSS
M-dimensional vector Vi = {r1, r2, · · · , rM } where M is the total
number of access points within the range of a location (xi ,yi ) ,
and M ≤ N . In reality, M will always be less than N , because no
location (xi ,yi ) can be within the range of all access points N . A
database (radio map) is created as a reference point to localize a
user during the online phase. An example of the database is shown
in Table 2. In practice, the RSS signal quality measured in decibels
is considered exceptional when it’s below -40, very good between
Table 1: notations and meanings
Symbol Meaning
RSS Received signal strength
rj RSS value of an access point j
Vu RSS values of user(u)
V RSS values for all N AP
C Encrypted RSS values
B = {△i }
s
i=1 The set of area of interest
SBF The spatial Bloom filter
B# SBF over the set of areas B
△i An area of interest
Enc(B#) Encryption of B# using pks
pku Public key of user U
sku Secrete key of user U
pks Public key of server
sks Secrete key of server
Enc(pku ,Vu ) Encryption of Vu using pku
{(θi )}ki=1 The k nearest neighbours
{Enc(θi )}ki=1 Encryption of KNN
tu The exact location of user U
Bu SBF build over tu
B#u Output of Enc(B
#) and Bu
-40 to -55 and very low beyond -80. We assign -100 to indicate an
access point is unavailable.
In the online phase, the user using a positioning algorithm gath-
ers RSS values Vui = {r1, r2, · · · , rM } at a location (xi ,yi ) . These





l locations and N access points in the database of the SP.
Table 2: wi-fi-fingerprint reference database
li ap1 ap2 ap3 ap4 · · · apn
1 r1,1 r1,2 −100 −100 · · · r1,n
2 −100 r2,2 r2,3 r2,4 · · · −100






















l rl ,1 rl ,2 rl ,3 −100 · · · −100
The Euclidean distance θi , which is a measure between V and
Vu is then computed to localize the position of the user. There
are various distance algorithm (Manhattan distance, Minkowski
distance, etc.) that can be used but in this paper, we use the Euclidean
distance :






Due to difficulty in making computation involving square root of
encrypted values, the squared Euclidean distance between V and
Vu is rather used in our algorithm as it achieves the same result:
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− 2ri j · rui
(2)
The k nearest neighbours {θi }
k
i=1 are then selected and the aver-
age computed to localize the position of the user.
2.1 The two-party protocol
The description of theWi-Fi-indoor location algorithm didn’t factor
any privacy concern and the computational limitations at the user’s
side. In this paper we present a novel algorithm where all these
concerns are taken into consideration. In addition, unlike other
location algorithms, where applications are based on the user’s
exact location, here the SP tries to learn the location of the user
without violating their privacy: in particular, the protocol will never
reveal the user’s exact location to the service provider, but only
whether the user is within any area of interest. Areas of interest
are pre-defined by the SP (before execution of the protocol). If the
user is outside such an area, the provider learns nothing.
The two-party computation involves the user and the SP, and
the communication happens over an authenticated channel. That
is, both sides are sure the messages they are receiving are coming
from the right source. With this protocol the SP is interested in
learning the location of the user but doesn’t want the user to have
access to the database used in computing the location, whereas
the user doesn’t want the SP to learn the exact location but only
presence in a predefined area of interest. This kind of problem is
called secure two-party computation where both sides cannot learn
anything about their respective inputs, beyond the explicit output.
Protocol 1 Privacy preserving protocol for indoor Wi-Fi
User Server
Enc(B#) Enc(B#), V
Vu ←$ {0, 1}
C ←$ Enc(pku ,Vu ) Enc(B
#) ←$ Enc(pk, B#)
C = {c j }Mj=1
Enc(θi ) ←$ Enc(Vu ) ⊙ V
{Enc(θi )}ki=1
θi ←$Dec(sku , Enc(θi ))
tu = (x , y) = loc {θi }ki=1





i ←$ {△i }si=1
0←$Otherwise
finalize
The proposed Protocol 1 addresses the concerns of both parties
by revealing only the area of the user’s location but nothing else
to the SP. The nature of the SBF filter, a variant of Bloom filter
[2] only makes it possible for binary input. That is, given a vector
of n -bits initially set to zeroes, k-independent hash functions are
used to map locations (elements) unto the filter by setting their
vector corresponding positions to 1. The user then shuffles these
positions to prevent the SP from detecting the exact location of
the user. On the flip-side, the SP’s database is also protected from
malicious users.
We now give a detailed description of the protocol. The proto-
col assumes a planar of rectangular grid covering finite points of
interest (PoI) with a space of 1 m between two grid points. Each
point of interest is within the range of M access points of a total of
N access points in the building or system.
In the offline phase, SP records the Wi-Fi-fingerprints multiple
times at each location for each access point and the average is
computed. Thus ri will be the average of ri j . Thus if j = 3, then ri
will be the average of measuring three times for each access point
at position (xi ,yi ). Like Table 2, the database is constructed for all
points of interest.
Algorithm 2 Spatial Bloom filter algorithm
Input : {△i }
s




1 : for i ←$ 1 · · · s do
2 : for j ←$ 1 · · ·q do
3 : foreach t ∈ △i do
4 : B#[h(t )] ←$ i
5 : return B#
The SP constructs a spatial Bloom filter (SBF) [5, 6, 16], a variant
of the Bloom filter [2] and a data structure that allows spatial repre-
sentation. Like the original Bloom filter, values are inserted using a
one-way function that supports probabilistic membership queries,
that is whether a member belongs the set or not. The SP constructs
an SBF over only areas of interest, then encrypts the filter Enc(B#)
and sends to the user.
The online phase is divided into four sub-phases: measuring,
computation, private localization, and the sever localization.
In the measuring phase, a user u, using a positioning algorithm
obtains a fingerprintVu and uses Pailler’s cryptosystem to generate
a pair of keys < pku , sku >. The key generation can be executed
once and offline, and the secret key can be kept until it expires (or
is compromised).
When the user receives a request from the SP, the user queries
the local dataset Vu and uses the pku to encrypt each ri j and sends
it to the server as outlined in algorithm 3.
C = Enc(pku ,Vuj )
= {c1, c2, · · · , cM }
(3)
c j = {Enc(pku ,−2r j ), Enc(pku , r2j )} (4)
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Algorithm 3 Private localization of user
Input : Vu = {r j }Mj ←$ {0, 1}
n
Output : tu = (x , y)
user outsourced location
1 : for j ←$ 1 · · ·M do
2 : Enc(Vuj ) ←$ Enc(pk, r j )
3 : post Enc(Vuj )
user private location
4 : get {Enc(θi )}ki=1 f rom S
5 : for i ←$ 1 · · · k do
6 : θi ←$Dec(sk, Enc(θi ))
7 : tu = (x , y) ←$mean {θi }
8 : Bu = create(tu )
9 : B#u = Enc(B
#) ⊙ Bu
10 : post B#u to Server
The computation phase: after the localization server had received
the encrypted fingerprint {ci }
M
i=1, it uses the Pailler’s homomorphic
additive properties to compute the Euclidean distance θi using a
set of Vi from the reference database to obtain the encrypted k-
nearest neighbours. As a further protection to the database against
a malicious user, the server permutes the distance ciphertext and
add a generated random number to it. The computation under
encryption is similar to Equation 2. Basically, the server encrypts




Enc(r2i j ) · Enc(r
2
uj ) · Enc(−2ri j · ruj )
where Enc(−2ri j · ruj ) = Enc(−2r j )
ri j
(5)
Private location retrieval phase: the user receives the encrypted
k-neartest neigbours Enc(θi ) line 4 of algorithm 3, decrypts it with
the private key sku to obtain the K nearest neighbours θi same
as Equation 1. The user then estimate the private location tu by
computing the geometric center of the k-nearest neighbours.
Sever localization phase: in the localization, the user first uses
algorithm 2 to construct a SPB over the exact location tu .The user
who has access to SP’s encrypted SBF Enc(B#) over the area of
interest (AoI) will perform entry-wise homomorphic product of
the encrypted SBF Enc(B#) and Bu to obtain B#u as illustrated in
algorithm 3.The user then randomizes the order of values in the
filter by shuffling Enc(B#), the output of the encrypted filter and
sends to the server.
When the server receives the encrypted filter Enc(B#), it uses
the private key sks to decrypt the filter and performs location
verification using algorithm 5. Should any of the hash function
h ∈ H return 0, then certainly the user is not in an area of interest.
Algorithm 4 Localizing user’s location by Server




computing knn in encrypted format
1 : for j ←$ 1 · · ·N do
2 : for j ←$ 1 · · ·M do
3 : θ [i] ←$ Enc(Vuj ) ⊙ Vi
4 : post {θi }ki=1
importing user location
5 : get Enc(B#u ) f rom U ser
6 : for i ←$ 1 · · · S do
7 : if △i = Dec(sk, Enc(B#u ))
8 : return △i
9 : else :
10 : return 0
But if the output bits is greater than 0 for all hash functions, and
the smallest output value is i , then the user’s position is tu ∈ △i
minus the false probability of the filter.
Algorithm 5 Verification of Spatial Bloom filter algorithm
Input : B#u , H ←$ {hj }
q




1 : for i ←$ 1 · · · s do
2 : for j ←$ 1 · · ·q do
3 : if B#[h(tu )] = 0 :
4 : return 0
5 : else B#[h(tu )] ←$ i :
6 : return △i
3 SECURITY
In this section, we present a security definitions for the two-party
computation protocol, based on the honest but curious model[7].
Thus, the parties follow the instructions of the protocol but may
try to learn more information than allowed by the protocol.
The two-party protocol is secure if at the end of execution, the
exact location of the user is privacy preserved and the server learns
only the predefined area of interest of the user’s location but not
the exact location. If the user is outside the predefined area of
interest, then the server learns nothing about the user’s location.
The protocol preserves the service provider’s privacy if, at the end
of the protocol execution, the user is unable to obtain the list of
the reference Wi-Fi-fingerprint (radio map), and the privacy of the
predefined areas encoded in the filter is preserved.
3.1 Security Discussion
To begin with, the user’s fingerprint sent to the server is encrypted
using the semantically secure Paillier’s cryptosystem. Hence the
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server cannot determine the closest neighbours to the location of
the user without the user’s private key sku . In addition, the exact
location of the user is protected from the server. This is achieved
by using algorithm 3 line 9, by encoding the exact location of the
user using (spatial) Bloom filter to produce an encrypted filter B#u .
Before the user sends B#u to the server, it permutes the filter by
shuffling it to change the order of the values corresponding to the
user’s location. After decryption by the server, it will be impossible
for the server to reconstruct the user’s filter based on the order.
Also, the security properties of the Paillier’s encryption algorithm
(or any other additively homomorphic encryption scheme) ensure
that the server learns only limited values of B# corresponding to
the non-zero values of Bu [10], making it impossible to identify
the user’s exact location. The server will learn only the area of
interest i if the number of non-zeroes corresponds to b and all the
values take i the area of interest. If the number of non-zero values
corresponds to b, but some of the values are > i , due to the collision
of the filter then the server learns only the area of interest △i and
some patterns of values but not the exact location. However, if the
number of non-zero values are < b, after the server decrypts B#u
using algorithm 4 line 7 then certainly the server learns nothing
about the user’s location making it privacy preserved.
We argue the protocol also preserves privacy of the SP data. In
that, anytime the user queries for the K nearest neighbours, the
server blinds the result with a random number that introduces
enough noise to prevent the user from knowing the real distances.
Also, the permutation prevents the user from knowing the indexes
of the closest neighbours though some information may be leaked
after computing the centroid, this is insignificant. To a larger ex-
tent, the database is protected so far as both parties follow the
instructions of the protocol. The privacy of the predefined areas
are preserved thanks to the homomorphic encryption of the fil-
ter. From algorithm 3 line 9, the user can perform multiplication
without knowing the cleartext of the predefined areas of interest
inserted in the filter by the server.
We do acknowledge that a malicious user may attempt to build
its own database by recording enough RSSI values over the same
field. However, as we can assume the area is controlled, this will be
practically unfeasible. Moreover, the malicious user needs almost
the same amount of RSS values to make accurate predictions.
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORKS
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving protocol for indoor
Wi-Fi-localization, that addresses the privacy of the user and the ser-
vice provider. In particular, our scheme uses partial homomorphic
encryption (Paillier’s cryptosystem) which guarantees the location
privacy of the user by performing the localization computation in
the encrypted domain. This, in turn, ensures that most of the com-
putational overhead at the user side is delegated to the server while
hiding the exact location from the server. The use of the homo-
morphic encryption also preserves the data privacy of the service
provider (SP). We use spatial Bloom filters in addition to homomor-
phic encryption enabling the SP to use location-based service to
learn the predefined areas of the user, but not the exact location
while preventing the user from learning these predefined areas.
When the user is outside these predefined areas in the building, the
service provider learns nothing about the user’s location.
We finally discuss the security of the protocol considering semi-
honest parties, i.e. they follow the instructions of the protocol but
try to gain additional knowledge. For future work, we plan to extend
the security features of the protocol to defend against malicious
adversaries. A three-party model can be researched, to outsource
most of the computation at the user side, which is useful in con-
strained embedded systems especially, defending against malicious
adversaries. In a three-party scenario, further security guarantees
for both the user and the server in the presence of third-party would
need to be researched.
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